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Abstract 
There is much controversy surrounding something what is conventionally called “financial innovation”. Yet, it should be in any 
case seen as a relatively substantial element in the functioning of modern economies. However, its general impact should be 
assessed from quite different perspectives, depending on its particular behavior, and subsequently, the role it plays in an economy. 
In terms of economic fluctuations, financial innovations are frequently assessed based on the cycle amplitude. The amplitude may 
typically be determined by efforts to evade a regulatory framework set by a central authority in the country. Most importantly, this 
contribution follows either Post Keynesian or Regulation School logic, trying to clarify business cycle volatility with respect to the 
intensity of innovative activities in the financial sector. At the same time, it also strives to specify the most important standpoints 
of contemporary mainstream economics. Its main conclusion is that higher intensity of financial innovation usually leads to a higher 
volatility of the business cycles, namely due to excessive pessimistic or optimistic sentiment and influx of supplementary credit. 
Additionally, at times it may also lead to so called self-fulfilling prophecy, which itself contributes to the major vector direction of 
the economy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades the problems of financial stability and financial innovation have been growing in importance, 
both for economic scientists and for economic policy makers. Similarly, the impact of financial/nominal variables on 
the behavior of real ones has substantially increased due to a number of newly created proliferation channels between 
the financial and real sectors of the economy. Further, massive deregulation in developed economies1, starting from 
the late 1980s, has brought about many challenges for policy makers in terms of financial market regulation and 
control, the overwhelming majority of which have not yet been satisfactorily addressed. 
This deregulation, coupled with the overall liberalization of capital flows and the dominance of conventional free-
market wisdom in general, has involved most economic sectors that have had at least partial linkages to financial 
products, instruments and/or tools. Similarly, it has involved economic sectors where the need for capital endowment 
is comparably higher, i.e. those often representing core industries of the economy. Finally, an unprecedented level of 
financial innovation activity, which is typical mostly of the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium, has only 
exacerbated the whole existing problem, all at once requiring new forms of economic and financial education.2 
Hence, it is no surprise that such evolution has led to a reaction on the part of theoretical economics. Almost all 
economic schools of thought have responded to the new challenges, using not only different methodologies, but also 
different assumptions. Some of these schools have even based a very important part of their raison d´être on instability 
issues stemming from this evolution. Among them is not only the notorious Post Keynesian School, but also the 
“French” Regulation School. However, many other schools have exploited the abrupt changes in the financial world 
to support, amend and/or adjust their own theories. This has been especially true for Neo Keynesians, “Austrians”, 
(Neo) Marxists, Real Business Cycle theorists3, and (Neo) Monetarists.  
As far as recent research is concerned, questions about financial stability have been put forth particularly by Post 
Keynesian thinkers, especially those from the “North American branch”. Among them, H. Minsky, P. Davidson, L. 
Wray, B. Moore, M. Lavoie4 and L.-P. Rochon5 deserve particular mention. Their works dedicated to the financial 
instability of the modern capitalist system and the efficacy of regulatory frameworks are well known in the whole 
economic academic sphere. Many other economists such as Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), B. Friedman (1986), 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Gertler6 and Gilchrist (1994), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) typically concentrate on 
 
 
1 The term “developed economies” might not always be perceived as the most pertinent one. As a consequence, a number of economists have 
an inclination to use different terms, such as “mature economies”, “advanced economies” or even “industrialized economies”. In this thesis, the 
terms “developed economies”, “mature economies” and/or “advanced economies” are used interchangeably in order to refer to the group of the 
wealthiest countries in the world in terms of real production. Perhaps the closest reference group could be thought of as member countries of the 
OECD. 
2 The popular term financial education conventionally refers to the spread of what is deemed essential financial knowledge in the general 
public. It might sometimes be confused with higher financial education, which has experienced a rapid expansion over recent years. By contrast, 
the expansion of higher financial education appears not to entirely follow the situation in the labour market. 
3 Conventionally abbreviated in economic literature as “RBC”, which is also the case in this text. Sometimes, however, “RBCT” can be seen 
as well. 
4 The “North American” branch is essentially perceived as the more “moderate” one, with very benign links to the radial economics represented 
for the most part by Marxists, Neo Marxists, radical socialists, feminists and radical institutional economists. Sometimes, even “Sraffians” qualify 
as radical economists, although the stream is relatively narrow and mostly based on Marxism. 
5 It is worth stressing, however, that Rochon is commonly treated as a circuitist. The circuitists, as opposed to orthodox Post Keynesians, believe 
that it is not the predominantly existing institutional framework which makes money endogenous, but that money is endogenous as such – or per 
se. This understanding is conventionally called money ab ovo and the circuitists like to distinguish themselves from Post Keynesians, especially in 
this very nature of money endogenity, despite their common or very similar standpoints regarding other attributes of modern economies. (Rochon, 
2003) 
6 Gertler alone wrote several important empirical papers devoted to financial capacity and economic activity and he admittedly inspired many 
financial economists in the 1990s. 
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credit cycles, financial cycles, as well as specific sector bubbles.7 Similarly, a link between purely financial and 
macroeconomic variables is being studied in more detail by an increasing number of economists. A large part of the 
research conducted so far has confirmed that financial variables are ever more dependent on macroeconomic ones and 
vice versa. Put differently, the causality involved can now apparently be encapsulated as a “two-way” form, which 
was strikingly amplified and demonstrated during the period of acute financial turmoil in 2007.8 
Financial innovation is one of the modern lubricants of this proliferation. It is typically understood as the 
development of new financial products and processes, acquiring different features in terms of liquidity and their 
relationship to the regulatory framework of a country/economy. Clearly, there are also some financial innovations that 
may not have any link to the regulatory framework whatsoever. These innovations are typically products that generally 
increase the velocity of money, such as credit/debit cards, checks, or ATMs. (Schrieder and Heidhues, 1995)  
Furthermore, Schiller (2009) regards financial innovation as a necessary element for the functioning of the capitalist 
system. Its complexity may not be detrimental given that complexity has been increasing everywhere. Schiller 
enumerates innovative elements that function in the economy and are treated as beneficial or at least harmless to the 
economic system (pension annuities, the refinancing of mortgages, etc.) In recent years, however, financial innovation 
has mostly been seen in the form of different types of securitization9, which typically signifies the risk dispersion of 
an asset and its attachment to assets with no direct link to each other in terms of character, maturity and/or currency 
denomination. 
According to Merton (1992) we can distinguish six roles and functions most typical of financial innovation: 
 
(1) Resource movement in time and space. 
(2) Resource pooling. 
(3) Diversification and risk management. 
(4) Information improvement for the improvement of decision-making processes.  
(5) Moral hazard and information asymmetry resolution.10 
(6) Economic exchange enhancement.11 
 
Historically, financial innovations have played an important role in the US economy almost from the beginning of 
the industrial revolution. They are linked to the development of capital and money markets in the US, those typical of 
the second half of the 19th century, which resulted from the rapid development of industrial-production capitalism. 
Although the situation and context then were completely different, banks and financial institutions were also capable 
of seeking new profit opportunities through the offer of diversified financial assets. Furthermore, their second most 
 
 
7 In their contributions, the mentioned authors do not necessarily follow any specific stream of economic thought and often stick to a rigorous 
empirical approach. 
8 The financial background of the crisis has been confirmed on a number of occasions. For instance, the so-called de Larosière Report finds the 
reasons for the crisis notably in excess liquidity, financial innovation, and low interest rates. According to the mentioned Report, “…liquidity and 
low interest rates have been the major underlying factor behind the present crisis, but financial innovation amplified and accelerated the 
consequences of excess liquidity and rapid credit expansion. Strong macro-economic growth since the mid-nineties gave an illusion that permanent 
and sustainable high levels of growth were not only possible, but likely.” (de Larosière et al., 2009) 
9 Securitization is conventionally defined as the transformation of various liquid assets into some type of security. The assets used may or may 
not have common denominators, may or may not be linked to each other, or may or may not have sensitivity resembling the behaviour of other 
assets. 
10 Interestingly enough, many financial innovations are typical moral hazard instruments. A good example is the credit default swaps – 
commonly abbreviated as CDS – that can easily be used without the necessity of even acquiring the concerned pool of assets. In other words, the 
buyer may not have any interest in the flawless functioning of the third party upon whose solubility the swap is actually issued. Many other good 
examples can certainly be found for other types of innovation products, and the question normally arises whether or not this is the intrinsic 
characteristic of the product or whether, in the course of time, such a product has turned into a different type. Similar argumentation can be found 
for instance in Švihlíková (2010). 
11 By the enhancing of economic exchange we mean primarily the streamlining of economic transactions due to funds being more readily 
available. It remains questionable what is still an innovation and what is simply related to debt-based economic exchange. 
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important motivation lays in increasing or at least maintaining their respective market share and keeping the overall 
expansion dynamics of the financial sector in motion. (Partnoy, 2009) 
This was accidently one of the reasons that led to the development of diverse forms of financial capital. This kind 
of development has, at the same time, provoked various criticisms, notably from Marxists, but also non-Marxist 
economists, criticism which was in fine directed against capitalism itself. A typical example of such critiques can be 
found in Rudolf Hilferding´s Financial Capital12, first published in 1910 (Hilferding, 1910 (1970)). Hilferding´s 
analysis of so-called fictional capital and the concomitant transfer of private equity to stocks can easily be considered 
as a precursor analysis to the financial innovation critiques of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. 
For the most part, terms such as financial capital or financial bourgeoisie are the ones very often used in the 
beginning of the 20th century. Likewise, they are closely related to the importance of the financial sector in the capitalist 
economy, including its interconnection with industrial capital, ultimately leading to the creation of conglomerates. 
According to Hilferding (1910 (1970)), the further expansion of conglomerates suppresses the productive capacity of 
economies, and industrial businesses find themselves incarcerated by the financial sector and its own interests. The 
consequent imbalances between the financial and real sectors of the economy were propelled by the centralization and 
consequent industry concentration that had grown apace in the late 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th century. 
This was caused inter alia by the existence of a different production pattern in the capitalist economy, when capital 
turnover time soared (compared to previous decades), and, therefore, substantially empowered banks and financial 
institutions. Credit provision and financial products began to play their indispensable part in the system, since they 
were helping to be able to react to the modified production cycle. The beginning of the 20th century thus marks the 
veritable beginning of financial and banking sector power vis-à-vis the production side of the economy. 
The rest of this first article is organized as follows: in the first chapter, financial stability is discussed, especially in 
the context of financial and economic turmoil; in the following chapter, the Regulation School and its contribution to 
economics is presented; the third chapter analyzes the effects of financial innovation on the economy and the role it 
plays; the fourth chapter sketches out the effects of financial innovation on the business cycle; and the concluding 
chapter offers some tentative insights into economic policy challenges regarding financial stability. 
 
2. Financial stability 
2.1. Pre-crisis and post-crisis context 
Financial stability is not easy to measure, as it is a very complex and interdependent variable. Many economists 
and policy makers have constantly tried to set out what financial stability means, typically without reaching any 
satisfactory conclusion or even consensus. However, surprisingly enough, the term has become familiar to many 
people in modern societies, as the frequency of its use has mushroomed in general media. Such a development might 
be ascribed to the many economic policy attempts to react to the increased importance of financial intermediaries and 
financial institutions in national economies as well as outside them. 
In the contemporary academic world there is a widely-shared view about the necessity of addressing urgent financial 
stability issues. For example, Ferhani (2010) argues that the importance of financial stability is now more emphasized 
than ever before, as financial turmoil has intrinsically affected the balance sheets of many central banks all over the 
world.13 Likewise, because exchange rates and inflation are of primary interest to most central banks in developed 
 
 
12 Although Hilferding took over a large portion of Marx´s theory, his presence in the Second International on the Austrian/German social-
democratic side classified him as a typical socio-democratic reformist. On this account he was mainly criticized by Lenin and Trotsky in a very 
similar manner to the way in which Karl Kautsky was criticized for his arguments concerning imperialism. 
13 Further, one could certainly single out a number of proxies and/or operational variables that may be used for its measurement. These have 
been progressively elaborated on during the establishment of regulatory frameworks reflecting the changing economic reality and institutional 
setting in economies with a highly sophisticated financial sector. An array of such proxies can be found in the well-known Financial Stability 
Reports, conventionally used (and created) by central banks or by international financial and banking institutions. These reports typically pay 
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economies, financial stability is a crucial variable that should never be underestimated or marginalized. Other 
economists point to the fact that the methodological perception of financial stability has changed as a consequence of 
the recent financial and economic turmoil. For instance, Borio (2011) states that prior to the crisis “ensuring the 
liquidity of institutions was primarily the task of (retail) deposit insurance schemes, aimed at avoiding depositor runs, 
coupled with central bank emergency liquidity assistance at times of stress”, while recently “the complete seizure of 
the interbank market and the reach of the gridlock in securitised credit markets, well beyond the banking sector, took 
observers and policymakers by surprise. This prompted huge interventions by central banks, supplying funding and 
purchasing assets on an unprecedented scale. And despite these widespread dislocations, by and large the payments 
and settlements infrastructure proved robust.”14  
The capacity of mature economies to self-equilibrate was put in doubt with the introduction of various forms of 
financial instability hypotheses ‒ primarily, the one proposed by Minsky15. Long before the run-ups to the financial 
crises of the 1990s and 2000s, Minsky (1986) questioned the validity of prescriptions from the pen of standard 
economic theory adherents in case money is not only a veil for the real production sector. This is a very important 
presumption for modern economies. As Minsky correctly puts it, “the logical flaw in standard economic theory is that 
it is unable to assimilate capital assets and money of the kind that we have, which is created by banks as they finance 
capital asset production and ownership (...) Furthermore, the financing of investment and capital assets holdings 
within a modern banking environment makes the effective money supply endogenous.” (Minsky, 1986) The approach 
that is being currently adopted tacitly follows Minsky´s logic in that “financial instability is a normal functioning, 
internally-generated result of the behaviour of a capitalist economy.” (Minsky, 1986) 
To demonstrate how a pure change in costs alters financial patterns of entrepreneurs, Minsky also developed a 
sequence called cash box condition. Every economy or a unit economy has to make sure to be able to generate enough 
internal resources—cash inflows (CIF) or to have enough idle cash balances (IB) to meet its cash outflows (COF). Let 
net cash inflow (NCF) be the difference between CIF and COF. It follows that: 
 
IB + CIF ≥ COF   (1) 
IB + NCF ≥ 0  (2) 
 
Further, if NCF is lower than zero and there are no idle cash balances, the economic unit is considered illiquid. In 
case the situation lasts more periods of time, the agent can be even considered insolvent. In other words, before the 
agent discredits her reputation16 by adopting some kind of radical solution such as asset sales, or even runs into 
existential troubles, she will rather try to find new sources of liquidity. The cash box condition eloquently presents the 
way how an economy can find itself in a dangerous situation and what is its safety margin. In terms of accounting, 
sources of cash can be as follows: income transactions (from productive process), balance-sheet transactions (interet, 
 
 
attention to a number of indicators that respective policy makers deem as crucial. In this respect, according to Gadanecz and Jayaram (2009), 
“composite quantitative measures of financial system stability that could signal these conditions are intuitively attractive as they could enable 
policy makers and financial system participants to: (a) better monitor the degree of financial stability of the system, (b) anticipate the sources and 
causes of financial stress to the system and (c) communicate more effectively the impact of such conditions.” 
One can apparently argue that such an impact has been brought about by the debt crisis in the wake of the financial and economic one of 2008-
2009. Nevertheless, central banks had got involved much earlier, most importantly with the creation of the ECB and the whole European Monetary 
System, which has contributed to mutual responsibility for financial stability in the European Union. 
14 It may be worth noting that deposit insurance served as a typical starting point for a number of financial stability debates. Since the beginning 
of the recent financial turmoil, this topic has evaporated from any debate. 
15 Minsky (1985) himself argues, among other things, that equilibrating processes, which could be presented in barter economies, are not typical 
for developed capitalism. It is most importantly money and the financial sector that considerably undermine such processes due to the advanced 
complementarity of economic events. He says, however, that his hypothesis “…is more clearly a theory of the cyclical behaviour of a capitalist 
economy than the economic theory of other post-Keynesian economists. That is, the financial instability hypothesis leads to an investment theory of 
the business cycle and a financial theory of investment." (Minsky, 1985) 
16 This is, according to Minsky, similar to a loss in net worth. 
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dividends, rents, and repayment on loans), and portfolio transactions (trading capital assets and financial instruments, 
sales of secured and unsecured debt, sales of assets).  
Similarly, with respect to the level of analysis (individual, sectoral, or on the level of economy), the possible sources 
of funds and main net cash inflows may also be different. (Minsky, 1975) Importantly, in case the trade with securities 
can be a standard source of cash at the microlevel, at the aggregate level liquidation is simply not possible. Therefore, 
one possibility to measure financial fragility at the aggregate level is to analyse the ratio between income and balance-
sheet generated cash flow. If agents need to make position, i.e. to meet balance-sheet commitments with portfolio-like 
financing, the more are the agents dependent upon the short-run financial conditions. 
Also, Minsky correctly notes that the essential difference between financial and technological innovation is that the 
former has no “natural” limits: “The rate of increase of financial variables is limited only by ingenuity and 
acceptability. In a world with layering, the rate of change of financial variables really has no bounds. The ability of 
financial layering to increase the burden on the payments mechanism is one way in which the conditions necessary 
for financial instability can be generated.” (Minsky, 1967) 
As suggested earlier, the focus of central regulatory authorities on purely inflation-related measures seems not to 
be sufficient anymore. A number of central banks succeeded in targeting inflation, which was pre-set to be goal number 
one in most developed countries, but financial stability was left behind. As the financial sector behaves distinctively 
pro-cyclically, when sometimes it even tends to create non-inflationary bubbles, financial stability may not always be 
clearly visible to central banks if only price stability is being pursued.17 This in turn prevents monetary authorities 
from adopting more stringent measures, as these would lead to a major aggravation of already existing financial 
distress. (Ferhani, 2010) 
3. The Regulation School: A Heterodox stream of Economic Thought 
The Regulation School 18  is a relatively heterogeneous school of economic thought, standing clearly outside 
mainstream economic theory.19 The foundations of this school were laid in the mid-1970s, in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis caused by supply-side shocks, ultimately leading to stagflation, and resulting in a revolutionary shift 
in existing economic policies. The very primal theoretical basis of the School is to be found in the works of Michel 
Aglietta (Aglietta, 1976), Robert Boyer and Jacques Mistral (Boyer and Mistral, 1978) and Alain Lipietz (Lipietz, 
1979). At the same time, the theory finds its theoretical backing in classical institutionalism – in Marxism and 
Keynesian economics – yet struggles to find its genuine raison d´être. The main field of interest of the Regulationists 
covers the development and regulatory tendencies of the capitalist system; they are especially interested in the process 
of replacing one regulatory system by another. Most of the exponents of the school regard this incongruity as a primary 
reason for the continuous reappearance of crises in the system. A more modern orientation of the theory includes 
(international) financial economics, credit provision, and the tensions such provision has created for industrialized and 
emerging economies. 
It is for the most part Aglietta (1998) and Boyer (2000) who are primarily concerned with internal capitalist tensions, 
resulting in the ultimate “capitalism-by-capitalism” replacement. This is generally perceived as a special kind of 
dialectic, inherently present in whatever complex system exists. Following such logic, the Regulationists claim that 
ford-type capitalism was substituted by post-fordism. In other words, capitalism based on accumulation was 
 
 
17 A striking example of the non-inflationary bubble can be taken for instance from Japan in 1990 and again in 2007. Yet another non-
inflationary bubble, with certainly less sophisticated and different assets and groups of assets, is the one of the 1929 Great Depression. 
18 The Regulation School is frequently dubbed the French Regulation School due to its geographical origin and the nationality of most of its 
adherents. Alternatively, this stream of economic thought may also be in certain literature called the Theory of Regulation or the French Theory of 
Regulation. 
19 On these grounds the school has sometimes been accused of being overly eclectic, trying to cover too many topics from a number of different 
perspectives. Likewise, the theory used to be widely criticized for not using modelling and mathematical methods in its research. This has been to 
a certain extent reversed, particularly by Boyer (2000) and Aglietta (2004), who started to employ multi-equation systems in their analyses of 
accumulation regimes and the evolution of credit provision in the run-up to financial distress. 
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evolutionarily replaced by a form of capitalism which, on the one hand, suppresses inflationary pressures, but, on the 
other hand, brings to bear constant downward pressure on wages and salaries in the name of effectiveness and 
efficiency enhancement.20 The inability of regulatory authorities to react when facing a newly established situation is 
subsequently one of the symptoms of distress and approaching crisis. 
Also, the Regulationists write ironically about the advantages of financial liberalization for capital and investment, 
when arguments such as “a rising tide lifts all boats” are used. This kind of argument is, according to them, solely an 
effort to defend an uneven “cake cutting”.21 Similarly, financial-innovative activities and credit availability have 
mostly been accompanied by waves of fraud, corruption and the concealment of information. A tendency to artificially 
lower risk perception has proved to be increasingly pervasive and more present than at any time in modern economic 
history. (Aglietta, 2008) Consequently, the neoliberal order manifested the ineffectualness of auto-regulation, which 
led to recurring crises in practically every part of the world. (Aglietta, 2008) 
Likewise, the Regulationists drag attention to a number of accompanying phenomena, much related to deregulation 
and financial-innovative activities. Among them, for instance, is the revolutionary change in wealth distribution vis-
à-vis the period from 1945 till 1970. According to Aglietta (2006), Amable (2005), Boyer (2000) and others, incomes 
were constantly under downward pressure while profits followed a rising trajectory. 22 This kind of relationship 
provides evidence of higher capital remuneration at the expense of labour and was partially caused also by the inflow 
of cheap eastern labour into the system, abetting lower salaries in relation to capital gains.  
According to the Regulationists, this also led to one of the roots of economic crisis ─ the undermining of effective 
demand with respect to the accumulation regime. In order to stay in proximity of its equilibrium, the former has had 
to be artificially complemented by credit availability supporting current spending. Credit conditions have been, on top 
of this, enhanced by the extended offer of financial products.23 Most Regulationists assert that the real era of financial 
innovation existed in the 1980s and 1990s. In earlier periods, the banks had been typically forced to bear 100% of the 
risk of their operations and had had to create sufficient reserves. The situation changed dramatically in these two 
decades, most importantly as a result of innovative activities. These enabled investment banks in particular to transfer 
risks onto different and dispersed subjects. This in turn liberated more capital for the granting of further credit. 
(Aglietta, 2009; Boyer, Dehove, and Plihon, 2004) 
The Regulationists consider the newly-created post-fordism, essentially based on financial integration, capital 
mobility and mutual interdependency, as highly unstable. As opposed to Post Keynesians, they try to look for the 
causes of such instability in the general inability to find a new modus vivendi between the financial sector, the real 
economy and the regulatory framework. In their understanding, a pioneering model is also the one based on creation 
of shareholder value, with low ratios of the equity employed. This brings in yet another destabilizing element into the 
capitalist system. On these grounds the adherents of Regulation theory support higher regulation of most financial 
transactions. This should, in fine, entail less risky behavior, and may significantly limit moral hazard and reduce real 
output growth based purely on the granting of credit and subsequent debt creation. (Aglietta, 2009)24 
According to Aglietta (2009), system crises should not be regarded from any normative perspective.25 By means of 
these crises, capitalism is more able to adapt itself to a changing social framework and changing conditions, both 
swiftly evolving over time. From a longer-term view, system crises are only episodes in system evolution and 
contribute to its better functioning, as lessons are learned from imminent flaws. It is apparent that in spite of its 
temporary decrement due to its taking-up of a predominantly neoliberal doctrine, the Regulation School approach has 
 
 
20 The focus on the behavior of social classes in the economy may be conceived as one of the common elements of Post Keynesian and 
Regulationist thought. Post Keynesians, however, conventionally use such classification in more economic terms. 
21 The “cake” made by all factors of production. (Aglietta, 2006) This is also sometimes called the primary redistribution (versus the ad hoc or 
secondary redistribution of resources). 
22 Similar argumentation, in Czech, can be referred to in Janíčko and Janíčko (2012). 
23 From this perspective, even the central banks in developed countries have been implicitly driven to conduct loose monetary policies. 
24 A very similar and, in some aspects, more elaborated explanation can be found e.g. in Holmström, 1979. 
25 By normative perspective the Regulationists mean the typical methodological division of economics between positive and normative.  
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recently been gaining in relevance. Moreover, as the awareness of financial and economic distress increases, the ideas 
of its exponents are now becoming even more popular with the general public, particularly in France.26 
Even though (some of) their findings, arguments and reasoning appeared to be somewhat deviant in the 1990s 
global economic as well as academic worlds, they might now help us to better understand the causes and consequences 
that are just being felt as the economic crisis becomes a debt one. Even in this case, the financial sector has been able 
to profit from the actual situation by proposing and supporting reforms that are not necessarily beneficial for aggregate 
and social welfare.27 The effects of moral hazard in financial markets28 can lead to a different outcome in terms of the 
loanable funds market than would normally be expected. 
The following part of the thesis concentrates on the rise of the financial sector, the existence of financial 
intermediaries, and, more specifically, the role of financial innovation in the modern era. 
4. An example of self-enforcing conclusion? 
Clearly, the financial sector has many crucial roles for the very functioning of the modern economies and in the 
whole global economic network. As Krohn (2011) correctly states, “a central function of the financial system is to 
channel funds from savers to borrowers. This can be done through financial markets (direct finance) or through 
financial intermediaries (indirect finance). Such a role of financial markets realistically exists and may be predicted 
based on the division of labour theory. However, it may go out of hand when the financial institutions grow in 
importance or ultimately start to create their own “desirability”. 
The evolution of financial sector in the 20th century would definitely not be easily predictable only one century 
back, since the then capitalism was based on different principles as well as on very different types of financing cycles. 
The same holds true for innovative activity that accompanied this evolution. Since the supply of credit belongs to the 
most important roles of financial institutions, innovative activities may help in pooling and channeling resources.29 At 
the same time, looking back at the history of financial sector booms and busts, we must conclude that variations are 
enormous and not entirely corresponding with what would have been intuitively forecast from the evidence of the past 
experience or on the basis of rational expectations.30 Referring to the Figure 1, we may see that in 2005 the insurance 
sector and credit granting contributes to the finance GDP the most, while trusts and funds the least. Likewise, financial 
assets linked to them have the highest proportion, and therefore show the lowest unit productivity. 
If we now consider the aggregate value added, all this must inevitably translate into an ever-increasing share in the 
economy. Although a US case is presented, very similar trend is observable in most OECD countries31, despite the 
 
 
26 It seems worth mentioning that perhaps the two best known economists of this stream called attention to the possible mishaps capitalism 
would face in the foreseeable future already at the beginning of the new millennium (Aglietta and Orléan, 2002; Boyer, 2004). 
27 A good example is the case of pension reform − being intensively advocated by pension funds that often even create complex associations 
and/or other groups to defend their interests. Economic reasons for pension reform can be found for instance in Janíčko (2011) and/or more 
rigorously analysed in Kubíček (2008) and also in Loužek (2006). None of these authors discusses the behaviour of pension funds as such or 
endeavours to consider their behaviour as a possible outcome of power-seeking.  
28 For the sake of clarity, in the whole text, while avoiding any specific definitions, financial markets are regarded in conventional economic 
terms. This means that these are places where financial assets (including debts and interest bearing assets as well as shares and equities) and foreign 
currencies are traded and where specific roles could be assigned to various agents, such as individuals, public or private national institutions, as 
well as public international institutions and multinational financial corporations. Financial markets are often divided into nation-specific ones, 
regional ones, and the global one, according to their geographical designation. 
29 Pooling of resources is typical in all productive companies, but differs according to their size. Despite the existence of number of financial 
instruments that enable pooling and channeling, many businesses find it less attractive as they are able to manage their cash reserves through their 
own capacities. For this they typically create an internal banking system where borrowing and lending is being done to effectively manage available 
liquidity excess. 
30 On this account, Philippon (2008) asserts that “contrary to common wisdom, there is neither theoretical nor empirical support for the idea 
that total factor productivity growth in the non-financial sector has a direct influence on the size of the financial sector.” This is also quite visible 
from the Figure 6 in the Appendix part of this first article. 
31 Whereby, this similarity is more pronounced with resembling GDP per capita level as well as with the level of economic development of the 
respective member state. However, the US financial sector remains much above the OECD average in terms of its relative importance. 
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fact that some methodological discrepancies may occur due to a different legal framework regulating specific types of 
financial industry branches. 
 
Fig. 1. Financial sector and insurance as a share of gross domestic product in the US (ratio to GDP; 1850-2010) 
Source: Krohn, 2011 
 
All this clearly shows that the recent evolution of financial intermediation goes far beyond what would be expected 
from purely economic perspective. Higher complexity of financial assets and surging OTC transactions may be one of 
the reasons for large portion of financial assets under financial sector management. This in turn creates a future raison 
d´être for at least some part of the financial industry. The only question is how much this asset servicing could be 
disconnected from real economic variables and eventually for how long. 
The genuine expansion of the financial sector is typical mainly of the 1970s, 1980s and partially also for the 1990s, 
when many instruments merging the risk came into existence. This is equally called a Golden Era of financial 
derivatives – instruments that had not been widely known before, but that began their tour de force immediately after 
they were publicly introduced.32 At the same time, increasing mathematization and, in general, quantification in 
economics, finance, and related disciplines, made many economists search for constrained optimization solutions at 
all costs. (Crawford and Sen, 1996) Besides this, the above-average salaries in financial advisory industry attracted 
many excellently educated people, who had or would have normally worked in physics, mathematics, engineering or 
IT industries, for example.33 This has logically spanned a mathematical spiral and caused a hike in yet existing 
information asymmetry between the providers and the consumers, i.e. between demand and supply side of the 
exchange.34 Moreover, such kind of imbalances bolstered up the status of the industry not only to the detriment of 
entrants, but also to the detriment of an indistinguishable mass of customers, conventionally called a “grey zone”. In 
the longer run, generally speaking, it could even take away a non-negligible part of the consumer surplus in favour of 
the producer one, but may also lead to a significant inflation of asset bubbles. 
It followed that the most elegant mathematical formulas, frequently based on multiple correlations, were able not 
only to offer some kind of scientific allure, but also a notion of preciseness and protection against diverse risks and 
riskiness. (Crawford and Sen, 1996) Instead of transferring these risks, the concomitant effect was to create them there 
 
 
32 That is when the best-known financial derivatives came into existence and were almost unanimously treated as a great invention of the 
modern era. 
33 Similarly, some authors argue that regulators are exposed to a similar situation ‒ in the sense that with an increasing sophistication of new 
instruments, their embanking becomes often impossible to fulfill. As a consequence, this can either lead to a deficient regulation, or it may result in 
a regulation that is not appropriate given the particular state of world, and thus it is harmful for all parties involved. 
34 The problem of information asymmetry in the lender – borrower relationship is skillfully and accessibly elaborated for instance in Janda 
(2006), Hanousek and Podpiera (2001) or alternatively, although less accessibly, in Inderst (2008). 
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where hardly anybody was able to expect them to ever occur. This is not that surprising as it may seem when we refer 
once again to a standard textbook on credit derivatives just as Crotty (2011) has done: “Even with a mathematical 
approach to handling correlation, the complexity of calculating the expected default payment, which is what is needed 
to arrive at a CDO 35  price, grows exponentially with an increasing number of reference assets [the original 
mortgages]. (…) As it turns out, it is hard to derive a generalized model or formula that handles this complex 
calculation while still being practical to use.“ (Chacko, Sjoman, Motohashi, and Dessain, 2006) Hence, it is relatively 
straightforward that under such circumstances no correct market pricing may be actually possible; i.e. no reflection of 
scarcity can take place ‒ at least on a continuous basis. (Crotty, 2011)  
5. Conclusion 
The presented paper endeavored to discuss important facts and theories about financial innovation and its impact 
on financial stability and business cycle behavior. In the recent period, we have arrived at a relatively consensual 
approach towards financial innovation in modern economies, an approach which follows Post Keynesian, 
Regulationist, and partially also mainstream economic theories. 
As has been argued, the general influence of financial innovation on consumer surplus can certainly be deemed 
positive (provided that elementary assumptions about consumers and consumer choice remain valid); the aggregate 
effect on macroeconomic stability is rather negative. This statement is underpinned by the constant violation of 
financial stability depending on the phase in which an economy finds itself. Hence, we are witnessing a “part for the 
whole situation”, in which what may be seen as beneficial from a microeconomic point of view is not from an aggregate 
one (or a macroeconomic one). The main sign of this imbalance is the increased amplitude of the business cycle 
compared to periods in which the intensity of financial innovation was less pronounced. The mentioned economic 
streams differ significantly as to who or what is, in effect, the main cause of this instability. 
From the perspective of recent developments, many mainstream economists have been forced to revise their 
position by making a quasi-U-turn. As a consequence, a number of measures aimed at curbing innovative activities in 
the financial sector as well as reintroducing financial stability have had to be approved and put in motion. These should 
also include the targeting of excessive behavior in both the expansionary and recessionary paths of the economy, 
avoiding thus a possible impact on long-term growth potential. As a result, for financial innovators and various 
intermediaries, it should be more difficult to bypass the regulatory framework in the economy. Even so, the problems 
of ad hoc efforts to regulate remain in place. One can perceive as very difficult to regulate the type of sectors with 
incomplete and often inaccurate information based on risks and dangers that are known not in advance and never fully 
experienced before. 
The financial sector is very creative, productive and almost irrepressible with respect to innovative activity. This 
gives it an edge before all regulatory institutions ex definitio. However, as Gaston Berger, a Perspectivist School 
adherent, put it, “the faster you drive the further your headlights must shine”. Clearly, much research is still needed 
in this field because the non-existent constraint on financial innovation can be a source of instability in both financial 
and macroeconomic systems. 
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